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1. Putin vse temeljne odlo\u010ditve sprejema osebno, na podlagi svojih sposobnosti, strokovnega znanja in ob\u010dutka zgodovinske odgovornosti. Nazoren primer tega je bil predsednikov govor na ruskem zunanjem ministrstvu 14. junija, v katerem je predstavil klju\u010dne dolo\u010dbe prednostnih nalog ruske zunanje politike in svojo vizijo oblikovanja nove mednarodne ureditve. Ve\u010dina udele\u017eencev sre\u010danja je pri\u010dakovala, da bo vodja dr\u017eave govoril najve\u010d pol ure. V praksi je Putin govoril skoraj 80 minut o tezah, ki jih je napisal sam in jih pozneje pojasnil novinarjem.<\/p>\n
2. Naloga zagotavljanja varnosti dr\u017eave ter za\u0161\u010dite Rusov in rusko govore\u010dih v Ukrajini, s katero se Putin soo\u010da od leta 2014, je postala glavni eksisten\u010dni dejavnik njegovega vladanja. Pred dokon\u010dno, mednarodno zagotovljeno ureditvijo tega vpra\u0161anja oblasti ne bo predal nikomur.<\/p>\n
Ne more predati nadzora, dokler ne bo pri\u0161lo do kon\u010dne, svetovno priznane re\u0161itve. Vse, kar bi bilo v nasprotju s tem, bi pomenilo, da bo njegovemu nasledniku predal neurejeno kopico nere\u0161enih problemov. Danes nih\u010de v Putinovi okolici ne zna bolje re\u0161evati te\u017eav kot predsednik. Putin se tega zaveda in je o tem trdno prepri\u010dan.<\/p>\n
3. Putin ne bo odstopil. V za\u010detku septembra je u\u010denka v Tuvi vpra\u0161ala predsednika: \u201eKako bi pre\u017eivljali dneve, \u010de bi bili navaden \u010dlovek, torej ne predsednik?\u201c Putin je odgovoril kratko in jasno: \u201eTo si zdaj te\u017eko predstavljam.\u201c To je njegovo najpomembnej\u0161e sporo\u010dilo v zadnjem \u010dasu – tako za Ruse kot za tujce. Putin pravi, da pri na\u010drtovanju svoje prihodnosti izhajate iz tega, da bom jaz v Kremlju. Na ta na\u010din je predsednik preveril resni\u010dnost za \u0161tevilne zahodne politike in celo ruske opozicijske aktiviste, ki so sanjali in se slepili, \u010de\u0161 da \u201e\u010de je Putin, je problem; \u010de ni Putina, ni problema\u201c. Dejstvo je, da je predsednik tu, da ostane.<\/p>\n
4. Zdaj je jasno, da je svet po ve\u010d kot dveh letih jedrske gro\u017enje, ki visi nad nami, pripravljen na prava pogajanja o tem vpra\u0161anju. Vendar pa obstajajo dvomi, ali bodo pogovori uspe\u0161ni. Najresnej\u0161i zahodni politik – in nekdo, ki dejansko razume posledice jedrske vojne – je predsednik ZDA Joe Biden. \u017dal ga \u010dez nekaj mesecev ne bo ve\u010d. Niti Kamala Harris niti nekdanji predsednik Donald Trump nimata dovolj zunanjepoliti\u010dnih referenc, da bi sploh razumela pomen tega vpra\u0161anja in s tem povezane nevarnosti.<\/p>\n
5. Zadnja leta in meseci ukrajinskega konflikta, brutalnih sankcij in radikalne preobrazbe gonilnih sil ruskega gospodarstva so jasno pokazali, da je \u010das, da na\u0161a doma\u010da javna in politi\u010dna zavest odlo\u010dno opusti prepri\u010danje, ki ga je neko\u010d zasejal poljsko-ameri\u0161ki mislec Zbigniew Brzezinski, da veli\u010dina Rusije temelji na njeni enotnosti z Ukrajino. \u010ce bo dr\u017eava iztrgana iz vplivnega obmo\u010dja Moskve, se bo status Rusije kot velike sile kon\u010dal, je opozoril.<\/p>\n
Toda to je bilo takrat, to je zdaj. Danes je o\u010ditno, da je mesto Rusije v svetu zagotovljeno ne glede na stopnjo bli\u017eine katere koli dr\u017eave ali skupine dr\u017eav. Osvoboditev od \u0161pekulativnih konstrukcij v glavah vplivnih ideologov je mo\u010dan dejavnik za normalizacijo razvojnega procesa ter oceno temeljnih tveganj in prilo\u017enosti. Rusija je lahko velika in pomembna sila ne glede na stopnjo povezanosti z drugimi dr\u017eavami. Veli\u010dina dr\u017eave se meri po stopnji blaginje in mo\u017enostih njenih dr\u017eavljanov, po dose\u017ekih na podro\u010dju zdravstva, izobra\u017eevanja, znanosti in tehnologije.<\/p>\n
6. Ko govorimo o ruskem gospodarstvu, ne smemo pozabiti na eno preprosto podrobnost: zvezni prora\u010dun, predlo\u017een dr\u017eavni dumi (parlamentu), temelji na ceni nafte 60 dolarjev za sod. Glede na napovedi bo povpre\u010dna letna cena nafte leta 2025 zna\u0161ala 69 dolarjev za sod. To je zelo visoka raven konservativnosti, realizma in treznih izra\u010dunov vlade Mihaila Mi\u0161ustina. Rusko gospodarstvo bo po pri\u010dakovanjih ostalo obvladljivo, hitrost razvoja pa bo zadostovala za soo\u010danje z izzivi, s katerimi se soo\u010damo. O\u010ditne strukturne in tehnolo\u0161ke te\u017eave leta 2025 ne bodo odlo\u010dilne. Na tej ravni industrijskega razvoja sta klju\u010dnega pomena uravnote\u017een prora\u010dun in stabilnost valute.<\/p>\n
7. Dana\u0161nji spopadi jasno ka\u017eejo, da je glavni cilj ruskih enot na terenu dose\u010di upravne meje regij Doneck in Lugansk. Putin pri na\u0161tevanju ciljev vse pogosteje uporablja naslednje besede: osvoboditev regij Doneck in Lugansk ter Novorosija. Domnevamo lahko, da je Novorosija le del regij Herson in Zaporo\u017eje. Glavno vpra\u0161anje pri tem je kopenska povezava s Krimom. \u010ce so moja opa\u017eanja pravilna, je mogo\u010de sestaviti konkretnej\u0161o sliko, na podlagi katere bomo lahko rekli, da je bila voja\u0161ka operacija kon\u010dana in da so bili njeni cilji dose\u017eeni.<\/p>\n
8. Poudariti je treba, da se je v zadnjih mesecih jasno spremenila ocena ruskega vodstva glede narave ukrajinske dr\u017eavnosti. To je glavna razlika v primerjavi s februarjem 2022. Danes Moskva priznava, da je precej\u0161nje \u0161tevilo Ukrajincev glasovalo za sedanjo vlado, se imajo za Ukrajince in si ne \u017eelijo prihodnosti z Rusijo. Na ta na\u010din Kremelj priznava ukrajinsko dr\u017eavo. Ko Zahod spodbuja zgodbo, da \u017eeli Moskva uni\u010diti Ukrajino kot dr\u017eavo, je to glede na dana\u0161njo realnost o\u010ditno protislovje. Poleg tega prav ta pripoved omogo\u010da zahodnim politikom, da trdijo, da se bo Rusija z uni\u010denjem Ukrajine pomaknila \u0161e bolj v Evropo – na Poljsko in v baltske dr\u017eave.<\/p>\n
9. Ko govorimo o morebitnih pogajanjih, Zahod ne omenja vpra\u0161anja legitimnosti podpisa Vladimirja Zelenskega v Putinovih o\u010deh. Pravijo, da je to o\u010ditno, saj Zelenski s svojim \u201emirovnim na\u010drtom\u201c leti po svetu. Zahodne partnerje svarim pred poenostavljenimi razlagami Putinovih pripomb in njegove zaskrbljenosti, da bi ukrajinsko ustavno sodi\u0161\u010de pozneje lahko odlo\u010dilo, da Zelenski ni ustrezno obnovil svojih pooblastil in da je zato njegov podpis neveljaven. \u201ePrevarani, prevarani, prevarani s kapuco in nato ponovno prevarani\u201c je nekaj, kar se ne bo ve\u010d ponovilo. Stopnja medsebojnega zaupanja ni niti na ni\u010dli. Zaradi popolnega nezaupanja je zdaj treba imeti polna pogajalska pooblastila v smislu razpolo\u017eljive pravne varnosti.<\/p>\n
10. Zdi se, da je vpra\u0161anje nove mednarodne ureditve, ki dr\u017eavam zagotavlja enako varnost, danes enako pomembno za odlo\u010dilno ve\u010dino dr\u017eav na svetu – tako na Zahodu kot na Vzhodu. Glavno vpra\u0161anje je, ali bo mogo\u010de ustvariti nov mednarodni pravni okvir za mirno sobivanje. Ne pozabimo, da sta se svetova Versaillesa in Jalte-Potsdama rodila na ru\u0161evinah katastrof prve in druge svetovne vojne. Zdaj so razmere druga\u010dne. Upajmo, da se je \u010dlove\u0161tvo nekaj nau\u010dilo.<\/p>\n
*** Prevod www.DeepL.com\/Translator<\/a> (free version) ***<\/p>\n *** Vir<\/strong> https:\/\/www.rt.com\/russia\/605836-putin-russia-west-countries\/<\/a> ***<\/strong><\/p>\n 17 Oct, 2024 09:45<\/p>\n By\u00a0Konstantin Remchukov<\/strong>, editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta. A former MP, he is regarded as a leading thinker in Russia<\/em><\/p>\n 1. Putin makes all fundamental decisions personally, on the basis of his own ability, expertise, and sense of historical responsibility. A vivid example of this was the president\u2019s speech at the Russian Foreign Ministry on June 14, in which he outlined the key provisions of Russia\u2019s foreign policy priorities and his vision for the formation of a new international order. Most participants in the meeting expected the head of state to speak for no more than half an hour. In practice, Putin spoke for almost 80 minutes on theses he had written out himself, which he later explained to journalists.<\/p>\n 2. The task of ensuring the security of the country and protecting Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine, which Putin has been facing since 2014, has become the main existential factor of his rule. He will not hand over power to anyone before the final, internationally guaranteed settlement of this issue.<\/p>\n He cannot give up control until there is a final, globally recognized solution. Anything short of this would mean handing his successor a messy bunch of unresolved problems. Today, no one in Putin\u2019s entourage is better at solving problems than the president. He knows this and is firmly convinced of it.<\/p>\n 3. Putin will not resign. At the beginning of September, a schoolgirl in Tuva asked the president: \u201cHow would you spend your days if you were an ordinary man, i.e. not the president?\u201d<\/em> Putin replied succinctly and clearly: \u201cIt\u2019s hard for me to imagine that now.<\/em>\u201d This is his most important message of recent times \u2013 both for Russians and outsiders. Putin is saying that in your own future planning, proceed from the basis that I will be in the Kremlin. In this way, the president has delivered a reality check to the many Western politicians and indeed Russian opposition activists who have been dreaming and deluding themselves, claiming that \u201cif there is Putin, there is a problem; if there is no Putin, there is no problem.\u201d\u00a0<\/em>The fact is, the president is here to stay.<\/p>\n 4. It is now clear that after more than two years of a nuclear threat hanging over us all, the world is ready for real negotiations on this issue. However, there are doubts about whether talks will be successful. The most serious Western politician \u2013 and someone who actually understands the consequences of nuclear war \u2013 is US President Joe Biden. Sadly, he will be gone in a few months.\u00a0 Neither Kamala Harris nor former President Donald Trump has the foreign policy credentials to even grasp the importance of this issue and the dangers involved.<\/p>\n 5. The past years and months of the Ukraine conflict, the brutal sanctions, and the radical transformation of the driving forces of the Russian economy have clearly demonstrated that it is time for our own domestic public and political consciousness to decisively abandon the notion, once sown by the Polish\/American thinker Zbigniew Brzezinski, that Russia\u2019s greatness rests on its unity with Ukraine. If the country is torn out of Moscow\u2019s sphere of influence, Russia\u2019s status as a great power will come to an end, he warned.<\/p>\n But that was then, and this is now. Today it is obvious that Russia\u2019s place in the world is guaranteed regardless of the degree of proximity to any country or group of countries. Liberation from speculative constructs in the minds of influential ideologues is a powerful factor in normalizing the development process and assessing fundamental risks and opportunities. Russia can be a great and important power regardless of the degree of integration with other states. The greatness of a country is measured by the level of well-being and opportunities of its citizens, by achievements in health care, education, science, and technology.<\/p>\n 6. Talking about the Russian economy, we should keep in mind one simple detail: the federal budget submitted to the State Duma (parliament) is based on an oil price of $60 per barrel. According to forecasts, the average annual oil price in 2025 will be $69 per barrel. This is a very high level of conservatism, realism, and sober calculation on the part of the Mikhail Mishustin government. The Russian economy is expected to remain manageable and the pace of development will be sufficient to meet the challenges we face. The obvious structural and technological difficulties will not be decisive in 2025. At this level of industrial development, a balanced budget and currency stability are crucial.<\/p>\n 7. Today\u2019s fighting makes it clear that the main goal of Russian troops on the ground is to reach the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. When listing his objectives, Putin increasingly uses the following words: the liberation of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, and Novorossiya. It can be assumed that Novorossiya is only part of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions. The main issue here is the land connection with Crimea. If my observations are correct, it is possible to draw a more concrete picture that will allow us to say that the military operation has been completed and its goals have been achieved.<\/p>\n 8. It should be stressed that in recent months there has been a clear change in the Russian leadership\u2019s assessment of the nature of Ukrainian statehood. This is the main difference from February 2022. Today, Moscow recognizes that a significant number of Ukrainians voted for the current government, consider themselves Ukrainians, and do not want to see a future with Russia. In this way, the Kremlin recognizes the state of Ukraine. When the West promotes the narrative that Moscow wants to destroy Ukraine as a state, this is an obvious contradiction, given today\u2019s realities. Moreover, it is this narrative that allows Western politicians to claim that by destroying Ukraine, Russia will move further into Europe \u2013 into Poland and the Baltic states.<\/p>\n 9. Speaking of possible negotiations, the West fails to mention the question of the legitimacy of Vladimir Zelensky\u2019s signature in Putin\u2019s eyes. They say it is obvious because Zelensky is flying around the world with his \u2018peace plan\u2019. I would warn Western partners against simplistic interpretations of Putin\u2019s remarks and his concern that the Ukrainian Constitutional Court might later rule that Zelensky had not properly renewed his credentials and that his signature was therefore invalid. \u2018Cheated, deceived, hoodwinked, and then deceived again\u2019 is something that won\u2019t be allowed to happen again. The level of mutual trust is not even at zero. Total mistrust now makes it necessary to have full negotiating powers in terms of the legal certainty available.<\/p>\n 10. It seems that the issue of a new international order that provides equal security for states is equally relevant today for the critical majority of countries in the world \u2013 in the West as well as in the East. The main question is whether it will be possible to create a new international legal framework for peaceful coexistence. Let us remember that the worlds of Versailles and Yalta-Potsdam were born on the ruins of the catastrophes of the First and Second World Wars. The situation is different now. But hopefully humanity has learned something.<\/p>\n *** konec<\/strong> https:\/\/www.rt.com\/russia\/605836-putin-russia-west-countries\/<\/a> ***<\/strong><\/p>\n10 facts the West must understand before talking to Putin<\/h3>\n
For too long, the US and its allies haven\u2019t listened to our officials. Those days are over<\/h5>\n
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